Kuehne & Nagel (AG & CO.) v. Geosource, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989 874 F.2d 283 by Mark A. Taylor \u2792
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 1989 
Issue 2 Winter 1989 Article 6 
February 2018 
Kuehne & Nagel (AG & CO.) v. Geosource, Inc. United States Court 
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989 874 F.2d 283 
Mark A. Taylor '92 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Taylor '92 (1989) "Kuehne & Nagel (AG & CO.) v. Geosource, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989 874 F.2d 283," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 1989 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol1989/iss2/6 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
GLISSMAN v. EKLOF MARINE CORP. 
United States District Court, Eastern District New York 
No. 85 CV 4339, 1989 WL 88058 (E.D. N.Y.) 
28 July 1989 
One may be considered an employer for the purposes of the Jones Act if it orders, instructs or otherwise exerts control 
over the seaman. One who exerts possession and control over a vessel may be liable for claims of unseaworthiness 
irrespective of lack of ownership. 
FACTS: In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he suflered in­
juries while employed by the defendant EklofMarine Corporation 
<"Eklof'l, as a seaman on Barge E-17. Plaintiff argues that the 
injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence and the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Eklof contended that the 
plaintiff cannot maintain an action against it under the Jones 
Act because it is not the plaintiffs employer: and that no claim 
of unseaworthiness lies because it does not own the barge. 
The defendant maintained that the A & C Ship Fueling Corpo­
ration I "A & C"l employed the plaintiff. Eklof produced 1983 
and 1984 W -2 income tax forms issued by A & C to the plaintiff. 
Eklof also asserted that A & C owns the E-17 and offered an 
inspection certificate issued by the United States Coast Guard 
indicating that A & C is the owner. Eklof did not produce a 
certificate of title. 
The plaintiff maintained that Elkof was his employer, offering 
his pension fund statements from New York Marine Towing 
and Transportation Industry Pension Fund !"Marine Towing" I 
listing Eklof as the plaintiffs employer. Plaintiff also produced 
union dues receipts issued by Marine Towing designating Eklof 
as employer. Plaintiff also asserted that all his orders and duties 
pertaining to the E-17 were given by Mr. Eklof, head dispatcher 
for the defendant. Eklof did not dispute this fact. 
In support of his contention that the defendant owns the E-17, 
plaintiff submitted as evidence a violation from the Coast 
Guard issued in January 1986, ltwo years after his injuries! 
indicating that Eklof owns the E-17. 
ISSUES: 11 I Does a question of fact exist in this case as to who 
the plaintiffs employer was for purposes of the Jones Act? 
<21 May a claim of unseaworthiness be asserted 
against a party in possession and control of a vessel, or only 
against an owner? 
ANALYSIS: An action brought under the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. §688 may only be brought by a seaman against his 
employer. Karvolis v. Constellation Lines, SA., 806 F.2d 49, 52 
( 2d Cir. 1986) In order to determine who is a seaman's employer, a 
court must look to "the plain and rational meaning of employment 
and emplo.Yer'." Mahramas v. AmericanExportlsbrandsten Lines, 
Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 171 <2d Cir. 1973), ( quoting Cosmopolitan 
Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 ( 19491 1. 
Tlie court must also consider who exercises control over the 
seaman and who instructs the seaman as to his duties and 
obligations of the vessel. This court cited with approval the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, 
Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 19801, that held that an entity 
that borrows a worker may become his employer for purposes of 
a claim under the Jones Act if that employer exerts control over 
the worker. 
The court believed that the plaintiff produced sufficient evi­
dence to create a jury question as to whether Eklof controlled 
him, and therefore denied defendant's Jones Act motions. 
On the claim of unseaworthiness the court noted that case law 
makes it clear that it is not necessary that a defendant have title 
to or be the record owner of the vessel to be held liable. Karvolis 
v. Constellation Lines, S.A., supra. One who operates, manages 
or charters a vessel exercises such control and possession of the 
vessel to be its owner pro hac vice. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 
410,412-413 ( 1963). 
Although the court was faced with conflicting Coast Guard 
documents of ownership of the E-17
d 
the court found a material 
question of fact as to whether Eklof di possess and control the E-17 
so as to be considered the owner pro hac vice. The defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the claim of unseaworthiness 
was therefore denied. 
B.J. Calamari '92 
KUEHNE & NAGEL <AG & CO.) v. GEOSOURCE, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989 
874 F.2d 283 
Admiralty jurisdiction does not exist for a claim of breach of a contract to transport goods on through bills of lading over 
land and sea, as this is not a contract for a traditional maritime activity. There is no admiralty jurisdiction for a claim for 
the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation unless the Executive Jet requirements are met. 
FACTS: The action involved a cargo shipment that became 
stranded in Turkey during its journey from Western Europe to 
the Middle East. The parties to the action include the three 
freight forwarders - Kuehne & Nagel 1AG & Co.l !''Kuehne & 
Nagel'"l, Panalpina Welttransport Gmbh i''Panalpina"l, and 
SGS Control! Co., mbH i''SGS"i, who made an agreement with 
Geosource, Inc. 1''Geosource" I, a Houston based company which 
owned all of Geosource Co., and also owned one-half of Ucamar 
Shipping & Transportation 1Cayman1 Ltd. 1"Ucamar"1, and, 
Ristram Seetransport Management Gmbh 1Ristram 1Germany11 
1 ''Ristram .. 1 which owned the other half of Ucamar, to ship 
cargo. The parties intended to form a consolidated shipping line 
under the auspices of Ucamar. 
To facilitate this goal and obtain business from European 
freight forwarders, a promotional meeting was sponsored by 
Geosource tor Ucamar in November 198:.:!. After the presentations 
were made, the three freight forwarders contracted with 
Geosource to ship cargo on Ucamar's through bills of lading. 
The commercial advantage which Ucamar possessed enabling 
it to attract customers was its ability to draw upon the combined 
expertise of Geosource and Ristram which covered both segments 
of the targeted route. Ristram contracted to provide Ucamar 
with licenses, stevedoring services and facilities to receive cargo 
m Turkey. Ucamar was to obtain bills of lading for the cargo to 
be transported and utilize local contracts to guarantee delivery 
to Iran via overland shipment from Turkey. 
The forwarders· cargo was loaded in late 1982 but while in port in 
Turkey in March 1983, Ucamar was unable to unload some of the 
cargo and clearance through Turkish customs severely-delayed 
the initial deliveries. Each party involved blamed the other for 
the difliculties which ensued and the end result was a breakdown 
of the entire arrangement. 
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff' has a cause of action in admiralty 
based upon the maritime tort offraudulent inducement to contract 
and a cause of action for breach of a maritime contract based upon 
the through bills of lading? 
ANALYSIS: The district court decided that admiralty juris­
diction did exist for the question of fraudulent inducement to 
contract. The court based its opinion on the two pronged test of 
(Continued ... ) 
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Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 
249 ( 1972). Executive Jet provided the test to be satisfied when 
invoking admiralty jurisdiction for maritime torts and requires 
that: ( 1) the alleged wrong occurs on navigable waters \situsl 
and (2) the wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional 
maritime activities \nexus). 
The district court found that the "impact" of the fraudulent 
contract "took effect" on navigable waters because the delays in 
unloading the cargo allowed the remaining cargo to be "at se�" 
waiting to be discharged. The requirement of Executwe Jet tor 
situs was provided with the linkage by the delay at sea.ln effect, 
the misrepresentations were manifested at sea. Carroll v. Pro­
tection Maritime Insurance Co., Ltd., 5 12 F.2d 4 !  1st C1r. 19751. 
The district court found that the intentional tort was so " · .. . 
interwoven with a maritime contractual relationship !at least 
in part) as to fall within admiralty jurisdiction.' " Kuehne & 
Nagel (AG & CO) v. Geosource, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 794, 799 n.6 
(S.D. Tex. 1986). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court 
and found no basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In the instant case, 
the fraudulent inducement took place at the forwarders' meeting 
in Hamburg, FRG. The tortious acts occurred before the contract 
was signed. An "impact" on navigable waters w1th mant1me 
consequences never happened and therefore the situs require­
ment of Executive Jet was not met, thereby invalidating any 
claim for admiralty jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that 
the parties to a contract with strong maritime ties must satisfy 
the Executive Jet situs requirment. 
As to the claim for breach of a maritime contract, the district 
court found that Kuehne & Nagel could not invoke admiraltv 
jurisdiction based on breach of contract. The first and foremost 
criterion to be fulfilled is the existence of a maritime contract. 
Rea v. The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 ( 19801. A traditional maritime 
contract does not include land transportation. Elements which 
establish a maritime contract are activities that are traditionally 
marine in nature with only incidental non-maritime activity 
being permissible. If there is a mix of elements, the admiralty 
court must separate the activities and enforce the maritime 
obligations. The bills of lading had a fixed single rate for the sea 
and land transportation. 
The Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district courts find­
ing that there was no admiralty jurisdiction based on breach of a 
maritime contract. In this contract, neither of the requirements 
are met. Although the situation did involve transportation of 
goods by sea, the route included a 1000 mile overland road trip 
which is not an incidental portion of the contract or something 
easily separable. 
Mark A. Taylor '92 
E.A.S.T., INC. OF STAMFORD, CONN. v. M/V ALAIA 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 26 June 1989 
8 76 F.2d 1168 
Breach of a time charter creates a maritime lien distinct from liens based on contracts of affreightment and requires 
delivery of the vessel rather than the union of ship and cargo to become effective. 
FACTS: E.A.S.T., Inc. ("EAST"l entered into an agreement 
with Advance Co. ("Advance") the owners of the M/V Alaia, to 
time charter the vessel. The charter party acknowledged 
EAST's intention to carry milk carton stock and bulk soda ash 
from New Orleans to Venezuela. Also, the charter agreement 
contained an arbitration clause that specified that this contract 
would be arbitrated in London and governed by English law. 
EAST subsequently entered into two voyage subcharters, one to 
carr_y milk carton stock and another to carry soda ash. EAST 
paid $26,700 in advance charter hire. EAST procured ship's 
agents, longshoremen, bunkers, and encountered other ex­
penses in preparation for the charter. The vessel went "on hire" 
on October 20, 1987. EAST and the two subcharters engaged 
marine surveyors to inspect the vessel. The marine surveyors 
concluded that the vessel was unseaworthy, was not suitable to 
carry the cargo and did not meet the standards of the charter 
party. The surveyors cited excessive dirt, rust and debris along 
with unseaworthy hatches as the basis for their finding. 
EAST rejected the vessel and filed an in rem action in Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where it 
sought to invoke the charter's arbitration clause and obtain 
security for a possible arbitration award. Advance filed a notice 
of appearance in personam, an answer and a counter-claim. 
Advance sought to vacate the vessel's arrest order, claiming 
that the maritime lien was insufficiently based, and alleging 
that a valid charter party had come into existence. Alternatively, 
Advance stated a maritime lien is improper for breach of a 
charter party, where cargo had not been loaded on the ship. 
Advance also contested EAST's claim that the arbitration 
clause was not enforceable. 
The district court first rejected the argument that a valid time 
charter did not exist. This court, relying on the reasoning of 
International Marine Towing v. Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd., 
722 F.2d 126 \5th Cir, 19831, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 82 1 ( 19841, 
noted that a martime lien was valid even though no cargo was 
loaded pursuant to the charter. The court also held that the 
enforcement of the arbitration clause based on i '' ··em jurisdiction 
was sufficient and that any defect in jurisdictwn was cured by 
Advance's appearance in personam to defend against EAST's 
action and to support its counterclaim. 
ISSUES: ! ll Did the trial court err in concluding that a 
maritime lien was proper for breach of a time charter even 
though cargo had never been loaded or placed in the possession 
of the vessel? 
( 2 l Did the trial court err in finding in rem jurisdiction 
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as a suflicient basis for referring parties to arbitration? 
ANALYSIS: The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the dis­
trict court, and concluded that the time charter between the 
parties was not executory because the vessel had been delivered 
to EAST. The court cited, G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of 
Admiralty 636 (2d ed. 1975!, which states, "ltJhe point at which 
the vessel itself is deemed to have commenced 'performance' 
sufficient to remove the contract from executory status varies 
with the �pe of contract involved." The court of appeals further 
cited G. Gilmore and C. Black, supra at 636, "lu]nder charter 
parties, the point of 'execution' would be the delivery of the 
vessel under the charter: mere refusal to deliver would only give 
rise to liability in personam ... . " 
The court of appeals rejected the assertion by Advance, that 
the time charter was a contract of affreightment and therefore 
remained executory until there was a union of the ship and its 
cargo. The court distinguished Belvedere v. Campania Plomari 
de Vapores, SA., 189 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1951!, which Advance 
claimed controlled the issue, on the grounds that the plaintiff 
was both a cargo owner and a charterer. The EAST court stated 
"l w ]hen, however, the charterer has, as in this case, entered into 
subcharters with the cargo owners, the charterer asserts a 
breach only of the time charter qua time charter and not of a 
contract of affreightment . ... " EA.S.T., at 1177. The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court's decision granting a 
maritime lien upon the breach of time charter. 
The Fifth Circuit also agreed with the district court that in rem 
jurisdiction is an adequate basis for referring parties to arbitration. 
The court of appeals found the Federal Arbitration Act §8 to be 
persuas1ve: 
1f the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise 
justiciable in admiralty, then . . .  the party claiming to be 
aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel 
and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other 
party according to the usual course of admiralty proceed­
mgs, and the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct 
the parties to proceed wth the arbitration and shall retain 
jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award. 
9 U.S.C. §8 
Even in the absence of this provision, 9 U.S.C. §206 authorizes 
the district court to refer the parties to arbitration in London as 
provided for in the charter party. The court further agreed that 
Advance's appearance in personam was a separate and sufficient 
basis on which to refer parties to arbitration. 
Edward F. Kenny '90 
